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On the Impact of Market Mergers over Herding:  
Evidence from EURONEXT 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: To present and empirically test for the first time the hypothesis that herding in a 
market increases following the market’s merger in an exchange group.  
Design/methodology/approach: The hypothesis is tested empirically in EURONEXT’s four 
European equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) on the premise of 
the Hwang and Salmon (2004) measure which allows us insight into the significance, 
structure and evolution of market herding. Tests are conducted for each market for the period 
prior to and after its merger into EURONEXT, controlling for a series of variables (market 
conditions, common risk factors, size) to gauge the robustness of our findings.  
Findings: Results indicate that, with the exception of Portugal, herding grows in 
significance, yet declines in momentum post-merger. We ascribe our findings to 
EURONEXT’s enhanced transparency (which makes it easier for investors to observe their 
peers’ trades, thus allowing them to infer and free-ride on their information) and its fast-
moving informational dynamics that render herding movements shorter-lived. These results 
are robust when controlling for various market states and common risk factors, with 
deviations being observed when controlling for size and market volatility. 
Originality/value: Our study presents results for the first time on the impact of exchange 
mergers on herd behavior. We believe these to constitute useful stimulus for further research 
on the issue and bear important implications for regulators/policymakers in view of the 
ongoing proliferation of exchange mergers that has been underway since the 1990s.  
 
Keywords: Herding; Behavioral Finance; Exchange Mergers; EURONEXT 
Article classification: Research Paper 
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1. Introduction  
A key development of the last two decades that has gradually been transforming the 
institutional landscape of capital markets is that of mergers among stock exchanges. 
Motivated by the needs of national markets to enhance their viability and competitiveness in 
an increasingly globalized financial system, these mergers have given rise to cross-border 
exchange groups of regional or global dimensions (McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2002). 
Despite the fact that exchange mergers transform a market’s dynamics by allowing it to 
become part of a group of markets bearing a common trading system and harmonized 
institutional frameworks (Nielsson, 2009), to date no study has explored their impact on 
investors’ behavior in the participating stock exchanges. In recent years much attention has 
been given to the issue of herding in financial markets (as evidenced by a series of studies 
confirming its presence internationally [1]), in light of the view that herding directly impacts 
asset prices and has important implications for investors. In the context of their relative 
performance assessment and the principal-agent considerations involved, fund managers, for 
example, often tend to copy each other in order not to deviate from their industry’s average 
(see e.g. Wermers, 1999); given the importance of funds in modern capital markets, such 
behavior would be expected to have a significant impact upon securities’ prices. Since market 
mergers are likely to impact both on a market’s investor-composition and its transparency, it 
is surprising that the impact of market mergers on this aspect of behavior has not been 
investigated. It is this issue which we seek to address in this paper. 
Specifically, drawing on the extant literature, we explain why market mergers may promote 
herding and empirically test for this in the context of EURONEXT’s four European [2] equity 
markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal). Our results indicate that herding 
grows in significance following EURONEXT-membership; more specifically, while herding 
was found to be significant pre-merger only in the Netherlands, it appears significant post-
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merger in Belgium, France and the Netherlands (herding significance is not detected in 
Portugal, the smallest market by value in our sample, in either period). We attribute this 
increase in herding post-merger in the group’s three largest European markets to the rise in 
volume due to higher overseas investors’ participation post-merger (which helped increase 
the flow of information [3]) and EURONEXT’s enhanced transparency (which allowed 
uninformed investors to infer and free-ride on this information by making it easier for them to 
observe the trades of their informed peers). In terms of its structure, herding in the three main 
markets is characterized by reduced persistence and more noise post-merger, consistent with 
improved informational dynamics motivated by EURONEXT’s sophisticated environment. 
Such a change in the environment helps to reduce the momentum of directional herding 
movements. These findings are robust to tests controlling for different market states and 
common risk factors. However, the pattern is sensitive to market volatility and size.  
We believe our work provides important insights into the literature on the effect of the 
institutional environment on herding (e.g. Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Goodfellow et al, 
2009). It is also of interest to regulatory authorities and policymakers given the proliferation 
of stock exchange alliances worldwide, reflecting the increased integration of capital markets 
and the fact that the prevalence of herding can lead prices to exhibit large departures from 
their fundamental values and give rise to destabilizing outcomes (Goodhart et al., 1999) [4].  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses why exchange 
mergers may boost herding in the participating markets based on both behavioral as well as 
non-behavioral arguments. Section 3 presents an overview of the EURONEXT, while section 
4 introduces the data and methodology used in this research and presents some descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 outlines and discusses the results and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Herd Behavior and Market Mergers 
Herding refers to the type of conduct involving similarity in behavior following interactive 
observation of beliefs, actions or action-payoffs (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). When investors 
find themselves in a state of imitation they tend to exhibit intentional disregard both for 
fundamentals as well as their own private information, seeking instead refuge in the 
consensus (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). In behavioral terms, several psychological 
forces have been found to underlie the decision to herd, including the conformity bias 
(Hirshleifer, 2001), the congruity bias (Prast, 2000), and the home bias (Feng and Seasholes, 
2004). From a rational viewpoint, investors may choose to herd in anticipation of 
informational payoffs, free-riding on the information of those they perceive as better 
informed by copying their actions (Devenow and Welch, 1996), thus leading to temporary 
blockages in the aggregation of information into prices and fostering informational cascades 
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al, 1992). Agency concerns arising from the relative 
(versus their peers) periodic assessment of their performance can promote herding among 
finance professionals (e.g. fund managers), as they can lead those of “weak” 
ability/reputation to copy the behavior of their “strong” peers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; 
Trueman, 1994). In this paper we test the hypothesis that the merger of a stock market into an 
exchange group leads to an increase in herding. The hypothesis is motivated by both 
behavioral and rational arguments, each of which will be discussed in turn. 
 
i. Behavioral dimension   
The behavioral impact of a market’s merger on herding hinges upon the well-documented 
issue of the home-bias, namely the preference of individuals towards stocks of companies 
located closer to “home”. The concept of “home” can assume various connotations, including 
that of an individual’s neighbourhood, hometown, region or country (Bailey et al, 2008). 
6 
 
Evidence in favor of the home-bias has been reported both for retail investors (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001; Feng and Seasholes, 2004; Ivkovich and Weisbenner, 2005; Seasholes and 
Zhu, 2010) as well as for fund managers (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Hong et al, 
2005; Baik et al, 2010), with results showing a higher correlation among investors’ trades for 
stocks whose underlying companies are geographically proximate to these investors’ homes. 
The fact that home-bias leads investors to exhibit similarity in their trades (i.e. herding) has 
been ascribed by Kuran and Sunstein (1999) to availability cascading. By encouraging social 
preference towards “home” stocks in a community, home-bias leads the community’s pool of 
information to be dominated by information regarding those stocks only, thus enhancing the 
availability bias in stock-selection towards “home” stocks. Furthermore, Huberman (2001) 
provides evidence suggesting that home-bias is the outcome of familiarity-bias; investors 
prefer stocks which appear more familiar to them. If such a mentality is widespread in a 
community, then conformity bias (Hirshleifer, 2001) can also contribute to home-bias, since 
the tendency to conform to the norm (in this case, the preference for local stocks) would 
enhance similarity in trading among its members. 
The merger of a market into an exchange group initiates a process of financial integration for 
that market which is expected to affect its local investors’ home-bias (Ferrando and Vesala, 
2005). In operational terms, exchange groups essentially function as single exchanges with all 
member-markets being subject to a uniform regulatory framework setting out the rules for the 
implementation of a harmonized trading protocol. The stocks of all constituent markets are 
traded subject to this protocol whose application involves the adoption of a common trading 
system (“platform”) by all member-markets, allowing the stocks of each to be traded through 
that platform from any of the group’s other markets [5]. An environment like this bears an 
impact on the availability and familiarity biases that underlie investors’ home-bias as it 
promotes ease of trading (investors in any member-market can view trading in another 
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member-market as being as easy as trading in their home market) and wider information 
diffusion (it allows information on each member-market to be more readily available to 
investors of the other member-markets). Consequently, we would expect investors from one 
market in the group to perceive the other markets’ stocks as less “distant” (Giofré, 2008), 
thus leading them to gradually expand the concept of “home” in their perception and identify 
it with the whole group. This implies that traders from each member-market will, over time, 
begin to monitor the other markets and observe signals similar to those of local investors in 
each. As a result, the number of investors with correlated signals in each market will increase, 
thus increasing the likelihood of herding in their actions (Graham, 1999) [6].  
 
ii. Rational dimension 
Market mergers also impact on herding due to the effect of the group’s institutional 
environment on the learning process of its investors. Exchange groups promote financial 
integration by unifying the trading and clearing activities across their participating markets 
through their single platform (Nielsson, 2009). Combined with the anticipated reduction in 
trading costs (Domowitz and Steil, 2002; Schmiedel et al, 2006), this encourages intra-group 
trading, thus widening the pool of potential investors for each member-market and enhancing 
the flow of trades (and, thus, information) across member-markets. Such conditions have 
been found to contribute positively to liquidity (Arnold et al, 1999; Pagano and Padilla, 2005; 
Nielsson, 2009), thus leading information to be reflected into prices at an accelerated rate. 
Although this should lead investors to rely less on the consensus and remove much of the 
ground for herding, the very transparency promoted through such conditions facilitates the 
observation of others’ actions as a legitimate mode of social learning if these actions are 
actually believed to reflect valuable information (Teraji, 2003).   
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Vives (1993) and Cao and Hirshleifer (1997) raise the possibility of investors basing their 
learning process upon prices, as the latter constitute a noisy statistical summary of other 
investors’ actions. Observing the price-generation process constitutes a useful input to 
investors’ learning because it allows them to tacitly infer the trading of other investors at the 
aggregate level without having to make a potentially costly effort to actually observe them 
individually. Hence, prices in this case function as a consensus-indicator whose precision 
(and credibility) will grow if pricing-efficiency improves as a result of the platform. Since the 
probability of people herding towards the consensus-opinion increases with the accuracy of 
the latter (Teraji, 2003), it follows that we would expect an increase in herding following 
market mergers if investors undertake indirect observational learning.  
Secondly, there exists the expectation that membership in an exchange group will reduce 
transaction costs. Microstructure research (Lee, 1998; Romano, 2007) indicates that 
transaction costs prevent traders from revealing their information in a timely manner, thus 
creating a “backlog” of hidden information, whose failure to be aggregated into prices leads 
to cascades [7]. Herding under these conditions grows in persistence (the number of investors 
delaying trading on their information rises with the duration of the cascade, thus prolonging 
it), yet cannot be considered significant (it is sustained by limited participation). A decline in 
transaction costs is expected to increase the participation of informed investors as trading in a 
market with less frictions is more appealing, thus allowing information to be more easily 
revealed through their trades. This will make it easier for uninformed investors to observe the 
trades of their informed counterparts and mimic them in pursuit of informational payoffs, 
thus leading to an increase in herding following a market’s merger into a group.      
A third issue involves observational learning, specifically of institutional investors, by far the 
dominant investor-group in today’s markets (Choi and Sias, 2009). More specifically, the 
reduced risk-perception associated with a highly transparent environment encourages fund 
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managers in possession of good-quality information to trade on it, while at the same time 
provides for improved disclosure and reporting requirements (Gelos and Wei, 2005). “Weak” 
fund managers motivated by the anticipation of career/reputational payoffs could exploit this 
transparency to identify the actions of their “strong” peers more easily and mimic them in 
order to free-ride on their informational content (Holmes et al, 2011) [8], thus giving rise to 
increased herding in a market following its merger into a group. 
As the above discussion indicates, there exist arguments both from the behavioral as well as 
the rational side suggesting an increase in a market’s herding following its merger into a 
group. The issue has serious regulatory and policymaking implications, more so in view of 
the proliferation of exchange consolidations undertaken since the 1990s internationally. A 
rise in herding can have undesirable consequences as it can lead to destabilizing outcomes, 
thus increasing a market’s risk. Therefore, we believe our study contributes significantly by 
examining this issue empirically in the context of EURONEXT, one of the first exchange 
groups to have been established internationally.   
 
3. EURONEXT: An Overview 
Exchange groups are the products of an evolutionary process dating back to the 1990s, a 
decade characterized by the liberalization of international portfolio flows, a surge in 
technological innovations and the gradual demutualization of stock exchanges (Aggarwal and 
Dahiya, 2006). This encouraged cross-listings, as companies began seeking access to capital 
overseas, thus stirring up the competition for liquidity among stock markets to prevent 
companies and investors from migrating to markets offering better terms of trading (Nielsson, 
2009). To that end, markets began to invest heavily in new financial products and their 
technological infrastructure (to enable them to handle ever-increasing volumes of trade), yet 
the growing costs involved led them to join forces and form cross-border groups in order to 
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benefit from synergies. In this context, EURONEXT came into existence as an entity in 
September 2000 as the product of the merger between the Belgian, French and Dutch capital 
markets, which unified their equity, derivatives and clearing segments. The group expanded 
through the acquisition of the LIFFE [9] (January 2002) and the Lisbon stock exchange 
(Portuguese stocks were first included in the group’s main indices [10] in April 2002), before 
entering a merger agreement with the New York stock exchange in 2007.  
Equity trading on the group’s common platform is modeled after the Nouvelle Système de 
Cotation (NSC) of the Paris market (formerly known as the [or La] Cotation Assisté en 
Continue – CAC - first introduced in 1986) which was based on an electronic public limit-
order book (Pagano and Padilla, 2005). Highly liquid stocks are traded in a dual (call-auction 
and continuous) trading system, whereas less liquid ones are subject to double-auction 
trading with ad hoc market makers ensuring the provision of liquidity (Kasch-Harotounian 
and Theissen, 2009). The platform is characterized by enhanced transparency, both pre- and 
post-trade, since traders can observe the entire order book and the trades recorded by the 
system, while the five best bid/ask offers in terms of price and quantity are publicly 
disseminated (Ginglinger and Hamon, 2007). Limits to this transparency are set by the 
presence of “iceberg” orders (i.e. orders whose volume is partitioned in equal-sized tranches, 
with the visibility of each being conditional upon the execution of the previous one), as well 
as the anonymity [11] of orders and trades (De Winne and D’Hondt, 2005).  
Table 1 presents data on the trading volume and market capitalization of the Belgian, French, 
Dutch and Portuguese equity markets for the 2003-2008 period [12], which is reflective of an 
increasing trend [13] in liquidity for all four markets. As the table shows, France is by far the 
largest market in terms of both capitalization and volume, followed by the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Portugal. Table 2 presents data on the shareholder-ownership in each of these 
four markets, revealing an increase in the position of foreign investors in the market 
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capitalization of Belgium, France and the Netherlands following 2000 [14]. Although it is 
impossible to assess the extent to which intra-group trading contributed to this increase, the 
figures nevertheless suggest that overseas traders had a role in the enhancement of the post-
merger liquidity of these markets. 
 
[Insert Tables 1, 2 about here] 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Our study involves daily data on the closing prices and market capitalizations of the universe 
of ordinary stocks listed on EURONEXT’s four European equity markets (Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands and Portugal) for the period  1/1/1993 – 31/10/2009. The fifth equity market 
in EURONEXT – the NYSE – is not included in the analysis given the very short post-
merger window (less than two years) for NYSE, notwithstanding the fact that given the 
NYSE’s size, the merger is expected to have less impact on this market. The choice of 
January 1993 as the start-date for our sample window is due to the limited availability of data 
for Portuguese stocks prior to 1993. To mitigate the possibility of a survivorship bias, our 
sample includes both active stocks as well as those that have been delisted at some point 
throughout the sample period in each market. Our final sample includes 4,164 stocks: 286 
listed in Belgium; 2,941 in France; 716 in the Netherlands; and 221 in Portugal. All data used 
were obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Datastream database.  
The empirical design is based upon the herding measure proposed by Hwang and Salmon 
(2004) for two reasons. First of all, unlike previous herding measures (Christie and Huang, 
1995; Chang et al., 2000) that test for the presence of herding conditional upon various 
market states (e.g. “extreme” returns or up/down markets), Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
measure herding without restricting its investigation to any specific market states. Secondly, 
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their model is the first framework capable of providing insight into the structure of herding, 
while also allowing its evolution over time to be visualized graphically.  
The rationale underlying Hwang and Salmon (2004) is essentially that, when investors are 
driven by behavioral biases, their perceptions of the risk-return relationship of assets may be 
distorted. If they do herd towards the market consensus, then it is possible that as individual 
asset returns follow the direction of the market return, their betas will deviate from their 
equilibrium values. Thus, the beta of a stock does not remain constant, but changes with 
fluctuations in investors’ sentiment. As a result, the cross-sectional dispersion of the stock-
betas would also be expected to be smaller, i.e. asset betas would tend towards the value of 
the market beta, namely unity. More specifically, they assume the equilibrium beta ( β imt ) and 
its behaviorally biased version ( β bimt ), are related as follows: 
( )(rE itbt  /  )(rE mtt ) = β bimt  = β imt  - hmt  ( β imt - 1)                                                                  (1) 
where )(rE itbt  is the behaviorally biased conditional expectation of excess returns of asset i at 
time t, )(rE mtt  is the conditional expectation of excess returns of the market at time t and hmt  
≤ 1 is a time-variant herding parameter. To measure hmt  (herding) on a market-wide basis, 
the authors calculate the cross-sectional dispersion of β bimt , as: 
)(β bimtcStd  = )(β imtcStd  (1- hmt )                                                                                             (2) 
Equation (2) is rewritten as follows: 
log [ )(β bimtcStd ] = log [ )(β imtcStd ] + log (1- hmt )                                                                  (3) 
in order to extract hmt . 
Finally, (3) is written as follows: 
log [ )(β bimtcStd ] = µm + H mt + υmt                                                                                          (4) 
where 
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log [ )(β imtcStd ] = µm + υmt                                                                                                    (5) 
with µm  = E [log [ )(β imtcStd ]] and υmt  ~ iid (0, σ υ2 ,m ) 
and H mt  = log (1- hmt )                                                                                                             (6) 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) assume that the herding parameter follows an AR(1) process and 
their model becomes: 
log [ )(β bimtcStd ] = µm + H mt + υmt                                                                                          (7)  
H mt  = φm H tm 1, −  + ηmt                                                                                                            (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) are estimated for each of EURONEXT’s four European equity markets 
(Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) and where ηmt  ~ iid (0, σ η2 ,m ). 
The above system of equations (7) and (8) accommodates herding as an unobserved 
component; to extract the latter, Hwang and Salmon (2004) employ the Kalman filter. Thus, 
in the above setting, the log [ )(β bimtcStd ] is expected to vary with herding levels, the change 
in which is reflected through H mt . The log [ )(β bimtcStd ] here is equal-weighted, since each 
beta is assumed to bear equal weight in its calculation.  
To construct the log [ )(β bimtcStd ], we employ OLS-estimates of the betas of market returns 
obtained through Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model: 
r itd  = α bit  + β bimt r mtd + β biSt SMBtd  + β
b
iHt HMLtd +β
b
iWt WMLtd +ε itd                                      (9) 
using daily excess [15] returns within monthly windows for each market. SMB and HML in 
equation (9) are the established Fama and French (1993) factors capturing the impact of Size 
and Book-to-Market, respectively, while WML is Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor [16]; 
finally, the subscript td indicates daily data d for month t. The choice of Carhart’s (1997) 
model here constitutes an improvement compared to Hwang and Salmon (2004) who based 
their beta-estimations on the CAPM and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor models given 
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that the momentum it takes into account as a risk-factor is one of the most robust anomalies 
in the finance literature (Griffin et al., 2003; Nijman et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2008). 
Having estimated these monthly betas for each market’s stocks in month t, we estimate their 
cross-sectional standard deviation for that month for each market, thus constructing a 
monthly time-series. As Hwang and Salmon (2004) argued, the choice of monthly windows 
is driven by both estimation considerations (to reduce the estimation error of the betas) as 
well as practical ones (to maintain a number of observations sufficient to detect herding). 
The significance of herding is inferred from the pattern of H mt . If σ η2 ,m  = 0, then H mt  = 0 and 
there is no herding. Conversely, a significant value of σ η2 ,m would imply the existence of 
herding whose first-order autoregressive structure would further be confirmed by a 
significant value forφm , the latter reflecting the persistence of herding. The absolute value of 
φm is taken to be smaller than or equal to one, since, as Hwang and Salmon (2004) posit, 
herding would not be expected to be an explosive process. Consequently, the joint 
significance of σ η2 ,m and φm  is necessary for herding to be considered statistically significant. 
However, the herding estimate obtained from the set of equations (7) and (8) is extracted 
under the assumption that herding is the sole factor underlying the variations of the log[
)(β bimtcStd ]. In reality, such variations may be influenced by several other factors, including, 
for example, the state of the market, other common risk pricing factors or macroeconomic 
conditions. Therefore, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of variables 
reflective of the state of the market, namely market volatility and market direction. Equation 
(7) would now be extended in each of these cases as follows: 
mttmmm
b
imtc rcHStd υµβ +++= ,1)](log[                                                                                (10) 
mttmmm
b
imtc cHStd υσµβ +++= ,2 log)](log[                                                                        (11) 
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where rm,t is the monthly return of each market’s index [17] and logσm,t is the monthly log-
volatility of each index calculated here using the Schwert (1989) approach. 
We then move on to explore the impact of established common risk-pricing factors, namely 
Size, Book-to-Market (Fama and French, 1993) and Momentum (Carhart, 1997) over our 
estimated herding by augmenting equation (7) in each case as follows: 
mttmm
b
imtc SMBcHStd υµβ +++= 3)](log[                                                                          (12) 
mttmm
b
imtc HMLcHStd υµβ +++= 4)](log[                                                                                (13) 
mttmm
b
imtc WMLcHStd υµβ +++= 5)](log[                                                                                 (14) 
To assess the impact of macroeconomic conditions over the significance of the estimated 
herding, we include the Treasury bill rate [18] (a proxy for the cost of credit) in equation (7):  
mttmm
b
imtc TBcHStd υµβ +++= 6)](log[                                                                                 (15) 
We also run the set of equations (7)-(8) one more time with all the control variables used 
jointly in the estimation, as follows: 
mtttttt,mt,mmm
b
imtc TBcWMLcHMLcSMBccrcH)](Stdlog[ υσµβ ++++++++= 654321       (16) 
As the above estimations are undertaken on the premise of equal-weighted cross-sectional 
beta-dispersions, we control for the possibility of any size-effect in our estimates by 
calculating the value-weighted version of the cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas: 
∑
=
−=
tN
i
vb
imt
b
imtit
b
imt
v
c wStd
1
2, )()( βββ                                                                                        (17) 
where vbimt
,β  is the capitalization-weighted average of the stock betas, Nt is the total number of 
active stocks each month in each market and itw  the weight in each market of stock i at 
month t (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). 
To test through the above empirical specifications whether the merger of a market into 
EURONEXT has had an effect over the significance of herding, we define the pre- and post-
merger periods in line with our discussion in section 3; more specifically, we assume October 
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2000 as the break-point of our sample window for our estimations for Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands and April 2002 for Portugal. The pre-merger period for Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands is January 1993 – September 2000; for Portugal it is January 1993 – March 
2002. On the other hand, the post-merger period for Belgium, France and the Netherlands is 
October 2000 – October 2009; for Portugal it is April 2002 – October 2009. 
Table 3 presents some statistics related to the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation 
of the betas, both equal- (panel A) and value-weighted (panel B), for each of EURONEXT’s 
four European markets before and after their EURONEXT-membership. As indicated by the 
table, the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas exhibits insignificant 
skewness and kurtosis, while the Jarque-Bera statistic does not indicate any departures from 
normality. Therefore, the state-space model of Hwang and Salmon (2004) described 
previously can be legitimately estimated using the Kalman filter. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
We test for the impact of each market’s merger into EURONEXT upon its herding using nine 
different specifications of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model as described in the previous 
section. Tables 4-7 contain the results from these tests. Our interest is concentrated on the 
estimates of the parameters of the state-equation (8), namely φm  andσ η2 ,m , since significant 
values for those two jointly would indicate the presence of significant herding. For each test 
we also report the value of the signal-to-noise ratio which is calculated by dividing σ η,m by 
the time series standard deviation of the log[ )(β bimtcStd ] and indicates what proportion of the 
variability of the log[ )(β bimtcStd ] is explained by herding; as Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
showed, the bigger its value, the noisier herding evolves over time. 
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Results indicate an overall increase in herding following the merger into EURONEXT. More 
specifically, σ η2 ,m  is universally insignificant pre-merger for Belgium (table 4; panel A), 
France (table 5; panel A) and Portugal (table 7; panel A), thus indicating the absence of 
significant herding in these markets pre-merger. Evidence of herding significance pre-merger 
is confined to the Netherlands, since as table 6 (panel A) shows, φm  andσ η2 ,m  are jointly 
significant for most specifications of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model tested. 
Conversely, φm  andσ η2 ,m  are found to be jointly significant for most post-merger tests in 
Belgium (table 4; panel B), France (table 5; panel B) and the Netherlands (table 6; panel B), 
thus indicating the presence of significant herding post-merger in the three largest European 
markets of EURONEXT [19]. The above pattern appears overall consistent across these three 
markets, with exceptions arising for the test controlling for volatility, the test controlling for 
all variables jointly and the value-weighted test, which will be discussed in more detail 
below. Regarding Portugal (the smallest of the four European member-markets) herding 
remains insignificant post-merger (table 7; panel B).  
The overall post-merger increase in herding confirms our predictions regarding the 
anticipated effect of a market’s merger on herding. However, additional insight can be 
provided by looking at changes in the herding structure which suggest that herding generally 
becomes less persistent (φm declines) and noisier (the signal-to-noise ratio rises) post-merger 
in EURONEXT’s three biggest European markets. To illustrate this, consider the example of 
France (table 5). As panel A of that table indicates, φm assumes values over 0.8 (with the 
exception of the value-weighted test where it equals 0.75) pre-merger, with its post-merger 
values (panel B) hovering between 0.56 and 0.61 (with the exception of the test controlling 
for all variables jointly and the value-weighted test [20]). In terms of its signal-to-noise ratio, 
in 6 of the 9 specifications the value post-merger is markedly higher than the value pre-
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merger; it never exceeds 0.23 pre-merger (panel A), yet produces much higher values post-
merger, in excess of 0.5 (with the exception of the test controlling for volatility, the test 
controlling for all variables jointly and the value-weighted test [21]). With φm  being the first-
order autocorrelation coefficient of Hmt, a decline in this parameter’s value would imply a 
weaker dependence of current values of Hmt upon their one-period lagged values. As Hmt 
reflects the relative change in the level of herding, this suggests that the effect of previous 
changes in herding upon its contemporaneous changes grows weaker.  
A possible interpretation of herding appearing to be mostly insignificant pre-merger can be 
traced in the lower pre-merger volumes in each market not allowing the formation of widely 
followed cascades. Any cascade developing pre-merger would, thus, have been based on little 
participation (and information) and would have been expected to last for longer (the smaller 
pre-merger volumes would have rendered it more difficult for sufficient information to flow 
into the market and dislodge it), thus resulting in herding appearing smoother directionally 
(lower pre-merger signal-to-noise ratio values). The rise in herding significance post-merger 
in Belgium, France and the Netherlands needs to be assessed in view of the wider 
participation, especially on behalf of overseas investors (see table 2), encouraged by 
EURONEXT. As the evidence presented in table 1 indicates, this helped boost the volume of 
trade and, in view of overseas investors’ perceived sophistication, allowed for more 
information to enter each member-market [22]. In view of EURONEXT’s enhanced 
transparency facilitating the observation of their informed peers’ trades, uninformed investors 
would find it easier to tacitly infer (and free-ride on) their information; this, in turn, would 
encourage herding, something further confirmed by our post-merger results.  
However, such conditions also affected the duration of herding, since they rendered the 
prolonged persistence of any cascade difficult to sustain due to informational reasons. This is 
because the enhanced information flow achieved through EURONEXT’s sophisticated 
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trading system creates an environment whose state is constantly changing, rendering 
cascading on any piece of information very fragile, since the high arrival rate of signals into 
the market increases the probability that a new signal capable of dislodging the cascade will 
arrive (Moscarini et al, 1998). The above, therefore, helps explain why herding post-merger 
is found to be significant, albeit short-lived in its directional movements and exhibits more 
noise in its evolution in EURONEXT’s three largest European markets.  
 
     [Insert Tables 4,5,6,7 about here] 
 
The significance of herding in Belgium, France and the Netherlands post-merger exhibits a 
decline when controlling for size, volatility and all control variables jointly. Regarding size, 
herding is insignificant in France post-merger for the value-weighted test, since, as table 5 
(panel B) indicates, both φm  andσ η2 ,m  are found to be insignificant for that test. As Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) suggested, a possible explanation for this is that there exists little herding 
among larger capitalization stocks and more among smaller capitalization stocks [23]. 
Controlling for volatility and controlling for all variables jointly renders herding insignificant 
post-merger for Belgium (table 4; panel B) and France (table 5; panel B), since in both 
markets σ η2 ,m  is found to be insignificant for those two tests. Suspecting a possible volatility-
effect, we repeated the post-merger tests for these two markets controlling for all variables 
excluding volatility. Results from these additional tests indicated the presence of significant 
herding post-merger for Belgium and France, thus confirming the presence of a volatility-
effect [24, 25] which we consider to be a very interesting finding. With herding defined in the 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) context as a reduction in the log[ )(β bimtcStd ] due to Hmt, this 
implies that changes in the log[ )(β bimtcStd ] can also be explained by changes in market 
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volatility, instead of herding alone, possibly because both volatility and herding are capturing 
parallel, information-driven dynamics. According to Ross (1989), volatility constitutes a 
proxy for information-flow, thus suggesting that the higher the participation of informed 
traders in a market, the higher its volatility is expected to be; however, the participation of 
informed investors tends to be more pronounced in markets with high transparency (Gelos 
and Wei, 2005) and transparency can encourage herding tendencies on behalf of uninformed 
investors in these markets as it facilitates the observation of informed investors’ trades. 
To visualize the evolution of herding over time we present results graphically. We first 
extract hmt  (according to equation (6), hmt  = 1 – exp ( H mt )) and then plot it (Figures 1-4) for 
each market [26]. We present here each market’s herding graphs for three specifications: the 
original one; the value-weighted one; and the one controlling for all control variables jointly. 
Other graphs displayed similar patterns with those from the above three specifications [27]. 
More specifically, the herding graphs produced controlling for market direction, SMB, HML, 
WML and the Treasury bill rate exhibited overall similarity to the graphs from the original 
model in all four markets. The impact of volatility over our herding estimations mentioned 
previously was also noted in the graphical representations of herding, since the herding graph 
extracted controlling for volatility was similar to that extracted controlling for all variables.  
 
[Insert Figures 1,2,3,4 about here] 
 
Looking at figures 1-4 we notice that herding has evolved in each market in a distinctive 
fashion for each of the three specifications for which graphs are presented. It is clear that 
periods of well-known financial crises are associated with reversals in the course of herding, 
in line with Hwang and Salmon (2004). One such case is that of the year 1994, a year marked 
by the outbreak of the currency crisis in Latin America, where herding appears (in most 
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graphs) to rise (and peak) before starting to descend. Another case relates to the second half 
of the 1990s, a period characterized by several financial episodes, including the Asian crisis 
(1997-8), the Russian crisis (1998) and the Dot.Com bubble-crash (1998-2000). Finally, 
herding is found to exhibit a peak (and subsequent reversal) in several of our figures during 
the last quarter of 2008, a point in time coinciding with the outbreak of the global credit crisis 
[28]. A possible explanation for herding reversing its ascending course during crisis-periods 
is that financial crises render the market environment more informative as they help reveal 
information which for some reason (e.g. pre-crisis irrational exuberance) was not 
incorporated into the public pool of information earlier (Borio, 2008). The revelation of new 
fundamentals reflective of the true state of the market removes the salience of the pre-crisis 
consensus opinion (it now becomes obsolete since it was formed upon pre-crisis beliefs) and 
this adversely affects the herding nurtured by this consensus. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper proposes for the first time the hypothesis that herding in a market rises following 
the market’s merger into an exchange group. We first explain why market mergers may 
promote herding and then empirically test for this in the context of EURONEXT’s four 
European equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal). Our results lend 
support to this hypothesis, as herding pre-merger is found to be significant only in the 
Netherlands, yet appears significant post-merger in Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
(with no evidence of herding in the smallest market, Portugal). We attribute this pattern in the 
three biggest markets to the rise in volume post-merger due to higher overseas traders’ 
participation (with the exception of Portugal, where overseas participation did not exhibit a 
notable change following its merger into EURONEXT) which led to more information 
flowing into these markets and EURONEXT’s enhanced transparency (which allowed 
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uninformed investors to infer and free-ride on this information by making it easier for them to 
observe the trades of their informed peers). In terms of structure, herding in the three largest 
markets grows less persistent and noisier post-merger and we ascribe this to the higher 
information-flow and changeability of the EURONEXT-environment which reduces the 
duration of the directional herding movements. The pattern witnessed in EURONEXT’s three 
largest European markets post-merger (herding growing more significant, less persistent and 
noisier) proves robust for several tests performed to control for different market states and 
common risk factors. Tests controlling for market volatility (in Belgium and France) and size 
(in France) were less clear cut. Regarding size, the post-merger herding insignificance 
observed in our value-weighted test in France implies that herding there was mostly due to 
smaller stocks; in the case of volatility, we argue that herding grows insignificant (in Belgium 
and France) when controlling for it due to volatility and herding capturing parallel, 
information-driven dynamics.  
These results have important implications for regulatory authorities and policymakers, given 
the proliferation of exchange mergers since the 1990s. Although our findings indicate overall 
that merging into an exchange group tends to boost the significance of a market’s herding, the 
fact that herding post-merger generates shorter directional movements suggests that any 
impact it may have in the market is short-lived, thus reducing the potential for destabilization. 
This evidence is encouraging as regards the evolution of exchange groups as it indicates that 
their sophisticated structures are capable of preventing prolonged herding episodes, thus 
being conducive to market stability. 
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Notes 
1. Evidence in favor of herding has been documented for both developed (e.g.  Choi and Sias, 2009) as well as 
emerging capital markets (e.g. Holmes et al, 2011). 
2. The explicit reference to “European” here is due to the fact that EURONEXT recently (2007) entered into a 
merger-agreement with the New York stock exchange; we do not study the impact of this merger over herding 
in the NYSE as the post-merger window in this case would have been far too narrow. 
3. Foreign investors are more likely to be informed when trading in a given market in order to counter the 
perceived informational gap between them and their local counterparts; consequently, a rise in their numbers is 
expected to be associated with an increase in information-based trading.  
4. As Goodhart et al. (1999) have argued, “…regulation should encourage diversification in behavior, and it 
should check the tendency to herding, since herding worsens systemic risk” (1998, p. 59). 
5. This leads to economies of scale, since the platform’s fixed costs are defrayed over the trading volume of the 
whole group (Aggarwal and Dahiya, 2006). 
6. Perhaps the simplest case of “correlated signals” for domestic and foreign investors capable of promoting 
herding in a market relates to macroeconomic information (which involves less ambiguity and effort in terms of 
collection/observation compared to corporate news) in line with the evidence produced by Chang et al (2000). In 
a relevant work, Economou et al (2011) provide empirical evidence in favor of the existence of cross-country 
herding effects between southern European markets.  
7. These conditions involve the parallel coexistence of two cascades, one of non-participation (comprised of all 
investors who delay trading on their signals owing to the presence of transaction costs) and one of limited 
participation (comprised of those investors riding on the limited information that moves the cascade).  
8. One might argue that a highly informative environment would render observational learning less important; 
with the platform providing the fund manager with a wealth of information, his incentive to observe his peers is 
expected to decline. However, the gap between “good” and “bad” managers is often not due to information, but 
rather due to the latter’s processing. In other words, even if joining a platform endows a “bad” manager with 
more information, it is doubtful whether they will grow less dependent on observing their “good” peers if their 
processing skills are weak. 
9. The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange is a London-based derivatives exchange. 
10. The two main EURONEXT-indices are the EURONEXT100 and the NEXT150; the former includes the 
group’s large-caps, while the latter constitutes a mid-cap index. 
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11. Anonymity was introduced in April 2001; prior to that, broker identifiers appeared on the system’s screens. 
12. The absence of consistent data-availability prior to 2003 prevented us from presenting data before that year. 
13. With the exception of year 2008, as it coincides with the outbreak of the credit crisis. 
14. In the case of Portugal foreign investors appear to maintain a relatively stable portion of the market’s 
capitalization throughout the years. 
15. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate for each market from the daily returns 
(calculated as the difference in the log of daily prices). The proxies for risk-free rates are the 3-month Treasury 
bill rates for each market adjusted for the daily frequency. 
16. We calculated the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors for each market drawing upon the 
universe of its stocks (active and delisted) during the 1/1/1993 – 31/10/2009 period. 
17. The indices used are the Brussels All Shares (Belgium), the SBF250 (France), the AEX (the Netherlands) 
and the PSI General (Portugal). 
18. The 3-month Treasury bill rates used previously to calculate excess returns for each market are used here. 
19. We mentioned in the beginning of this section that nine tests are undertaken for each market in each of the 
two periods (pre-/post-merger). The exceptions in terms of equal-weighted tests for the documented herding 
significance in the Netherlands pre-merger and Belgium and France post-merger are the two tests that include 
volatility in their specification. In addition, for the Netherlands and France, the value-weighted test is also an 
exception. 
20. The value of the persistence parameter for the tests including all variables jointly is almost 0.95, while it 
reaches almost 0.94 in the value-weighted test.  
21.  The value of the signal-to-noise ratio equals 0.104 for the test controlling for all variables jointly and almost 
0.08 for the value-weighted test. Controlling for volatility returns provided us with a signal-to-noise ratio equal 
to 0.36 which is still higher than its pre-merger values. 
22. The fact that the proportion of overseas shareholder-ownership in Portugal stayed relatively constant 
throughout the years (it hovered within a 40-46% band as table 2 indicates) compared to the other three 
EURONEXT-markets (where it exhibited increasing trends post-1999) constitutes a possible explanation of why 
herding remained insignificant in Portugal post-merger. The figures in table 2 suggest that the entry of Portugal 
in the EURONEXT did not produce a rise in overseas traders’ participation as opposed to the rest of the group’s 
markets, thus leaving investors’ composition relatively unchanged – and having no effect over herding there.   
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23. The possibility of herding here being stronger for small stocks is supported by the literature (e.g. Wermers, 
1999) according to which investors herd more when trading small caps due to the higher informational and 
liquidity risks associated with them. The issue here is that small caps tend to enjoy relatively low analyst 
coverage compared to their larger peers, meaning greater informational uncertainty. As this also implies 
decreased visibility in the market, these stocks are likely to be less actively traded. Consequently, an investor 
buying into such a stock might have difficulty selling it at a time of their choice. 
24. Results are not reported for reasons of brevity but are available upon request from the authors. 
25. With the Netherlands being the sole market producing evidence of herding significance pre-merger and with 
this significance disappearing once controlling for volatility and for all variables jointly (see table 6; panel A), 
we tested for herding controlling for all variables excluding volatility; results indicated the significance of 
herding pre-merger for the Netherlands, thus again confirming the presence of a volatility-effect in our findings. 
26. For each test-specification, we obtain hmt from each of its tests (pre-/post-merger), plot herding for each test 
and then combine the two graphs (pre-/post-merger) into one. For robustness reasons, we also test for each 
specification on the premise of the full sample period; the final graph for each specification is the same no 
matter which approach we follow. 
27. These graphs are not reported for reasons of space but are available upon request from the authors. 
28. In view of the global credit crisis and its impact on international markets, we repeated all our post-merger 
tests using August 2008 as the end-date to exclude any possible effect of this crisis. Our tests produced evidence 
similar to that of the original post-merger period tests. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
References 
 
Aggarwal, R. and Dahiya, S. (2006), “Demutualization and public offerings of financial 
exchanges”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 96-106. 
Arnold, T., Hersch, P., Mulherin, J. H. and Netter, J. (1999), “Merging markets”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 54 No. 3, pp.1083-1107.  
Baik, B., Kang, J-K. and Kim, J-M. (2010), “Local institutional investors, information 
asymmetries, and equity returns”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 97 No. 1, pp. 81-
106. 
Bailey, W., Kumar, A. and Ng, D. (2008), “Foreign investments of US individual investors: 
causes and consequences”, Management Science, Vol. 54 No. 3, pp. 443-459. 
Banerjee, A.V. (1992), “A simple model of herd behavior”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 107 No. 3, pp. 797-817. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992), “A theory of fads, fashion, custom, 
and cultural change as informational cascades”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100 No. 
5, pp. 992-1026.  
Bikhchandani S. and Sharma, S. (2001), “Herd behavior in financial markets”, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 279-310. 
Borio, C. (2008), “The financial turmoil of 2007-?: A preliminary assessment and some 
policy considerations”, working Paper 251, Bank for International Settlements 
Cao, H. H. and Hirshleifer, D. (1997), “Limited observability, reporting biases, and 
informational cascades”, working paper, Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University. 
Carhart, M.M. (1997), “On persistence in mutual fund performance”, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 57-82. 
27 
 
Chang, E.C., Cheng, J.W. and Khorana, A. (2000), “An examination of herd behavior in 
equity markets: an international perspective”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 24 No. 
10, pp. 1651-1679. 
Choi, N. and Sias, R.W. (2009), “Institutional industry herding”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 94 No. 3, pp. 469-491. 
Christie, W.G. and Huang, R.D. (1995), “Following the pied piper: do individual returns herd 
around the market?”, Financial Analysts Journal, July – August Vol. No. 4, pp. 31-37. 
Coval, J. D. and Moskowitz, T. J. (1999), “Home bias at home: Local equity preference in 
domestic portfolios”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 No. 6, pp. 2045-2073. 
Coval, J. D. and Moskowitz, T. J. (2001), “The geography of investment: Informed trading 
and asset prices”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109 No.4, pp. 811-841. 
Devenow, A. and Welch, I. (1996), “Rational herding in financial economics”, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 3-5, pp. 603-615. 
De Winne, R. and D’Hondt, C. (2005), “Market transparency and traders’ behavior: an 
analysis on Euronext with full order book data”, working paper, FUCam – Catholic 
University of Mons. 
Domowitz, I. and Steil, B. (2002), Securities trading, technological innovation and 
economic performance, Princeton University Press.  
Economou, F., Kostakis, A. and Philippas, N. (2011), “Cross-country effects in herding 
behavior: Evidence from four south European markets”, Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 443-460. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (1993), “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 3-56. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (2008), “Dissecting anomalies”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 63 
No. 4, pp. 1653-1678. 
28 
 
Feng, L. and Seasholes, M.S. (2004), “Correlated trading and location”, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 59 No. 5, pp. 2117-2144. 
Ferrando, A. and Vesala, J. (2005), “Concepts and measures of financial integration”, In J.M. 
Berg, Grande, M. and Mongelli, F.P. (Eds.), Elements of the euro area, Aldershot et al: 
Ashgate, pp. 53-66.  
Gelos, R. G. and Wei, S.-J. (2005), “Transparency and international portfolio holdings”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, No. 6, pp. 2987-3020. 
Ginglinger E. and Hamon, J. (2007), “Actual share repurchases, timing and liquidity”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 915-938.  
Giofré, M. (2008), “Bias in foreign equity portfolios: households versus financial investors”, 
CERP - Collegio Carlo Alberto Working Paper.  
Goodfellow, C., Bohl, M. and Gebka, B. (2009), “Together we invest? Individual and 
institutional investors’ trading behavior in Poland”, International Review of Financial 
Analysis, Vol. 18 No.2, pp. 212-221. 
Goodhart, C., Hartmann, P., Llewellyn, D., Rojas-Suarez, L. and Weisbrod, S. (1999), 
Financial regulation: why, how and where now?, Routledge: London 
Graham, J.R. (1999), “Herding among investment newsletters: theory and evidence”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 No. 1, pp. 237.268.  
Griffin, J.M., Ji, S. and Martin J.S. (2003), “Momentum investing and business cycle risk: 
evidence from pole to pole”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58 No. 6, pp. 2515-2547. 
Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2001), “How distance, language, and culture influence 
stockholdings and trades”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 No. 3, pp. 1053-1073. 
Hirshleifer, D. (2001), “Investor psychology and asset pricing”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 
No. 4, pp. 1533-1598. 
29 
 
Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S.T. (2003), “Herd behavior and cascading in capital markets: a 
review and synthesis”, European Financial Management, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 25-66. 
Holmes, P.R., Kallinterakis, V. and Leite Ferreira, M.P. (2011), “Herding and window 
dressing in a concentrated market: a question of intent”, European Financial Management, In 
press. 
Hong, H., Kubik, J. and Stein, J. C. (2005), “Thy neighbor’s portfolio: Word-of-mouth 
effects in the holdings and trades of money managers”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60 No. 6, 
pp. 2801-2824. 
Huberman, G. (2001), “Familiarity breeds investment”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14 
No. 3, pp. 659-680.  
Hwang, S. and Salmon, M. (2004), “Market stress and herding”, Journal of Empirical 
Finance, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 585-616.  
Ivkovich, Z. and Weisbenner, S. (2005), “Local does as local is: Information content of the 
geography of individual investors’ common stock investments”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60 
No. 1, pp. 267-306. 
Kasch-Haroutounian, M. and Theissen, E. (2009), “Competition between exchanges: 
Euronext versus Xetra”, European Financial Management, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 181-207. 
Kuran, T. and Sunstein, C. (1999), “Availability cascades and risk regulation”, Stanford Law 
Review, Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 683-768. 
Lee, I.H. (1998), “Market crashes and informational avalanches”, Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 65 No. 4, pp. 741-759. 
McAndrews, J. and Stefanadis, C. (2002), “The consolidation of European stock exchanges”, 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Vol. 8 No. 6, 
pp. 1-6. 
30 
 
Moscarini, M., Ottaviani, M. and Smith, L. (1998), “Social learning in a changing world”, 
Economic Theory, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 657-665. 
Nielsson, U. (2009), “Stock exchange merger and liquidity: the case of Euronext”, Journal of 
Financial Markets, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 229-267. 
Nijman, T., Swinkels, L. and Verbeek, M. (2004), “Do countries or industries explain 
momentum in Europe?”, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 461-481. 
Pagano, M. and Padilla, A.J. (2005), “Efficiency gains from the integration of stock 
exchanges: lessons from the Euronext natural experiment”, LECG. 
Prast, H.M. (2000), “Herding and financial panics: a role for cognitive psychology?”, 
Research Memorandum WO & E No. 611, Netherlands Central Bank. 
Romano, M. G. (2007), “Learning, cascades and transaction-costs”, Review of Finance, Vol. 
11 No. 3, pp. 527.560. 
Ross, S.A. (1989), “Information and volatility: the no-arbitrage martingale approach to 
timing and resolution irrelevancy”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 No.1, pp. 1-17. 
Scharfstein, D.S. and Stein, J.C. (1990), “Herd behavior and investment”, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 80 No. 3, pp. 465-479. 
Schmiedel, H.,  Malkamaki, M. and Tarkka, J. (2006), “Economies of scale and technological 
development in securities depository and settlement systems”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 30 No. 6, pp. 1783-1806. 
Schwert G.W. (1989), “Why does stock market volatility change over time”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 44 No. 5, pp. 1115-1553. 
Seasholes, M. and Zhu, N. (2010), “Individual investors and local bias”, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 65 No. 5, pp. 1987-2010. 
Teraji, S. (2003), “Herd behavior and the quality of opinions”, Journal of Socio-Economics, 
Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 661-673. 
31 
 
Trueman, B. (1994), “Analyst forecasts and herding behavior”, Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 97-124. 
Vives, X. (1993), “How fast do rational agents learn?”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60 
No. 2, pp. 329-347. 
Voronkova, S. and Bohl, M.T. (2005), “Institutional traders’ behavior in an emerging stock 
market: Empirical evidence on Polish pension fund investors”, Journal of Business, Finance 
and Accounting, Vol. 32 No. 7&8, pp. 1537-1560. 
Wermers, R. (1999), “Mutual fund herding and the impact on stock prices”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 54 No. 2, pp. 581-622.  
32 
 
Table 1: Trading activity in EURONEXT’s European equity markets 
  
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
Panel A: Equity turnover 
2003 33,755 877,798 429,022 19,020 
2004 55,867 993,926 465,831 27,343 
2005 91,049 1,103,352 558,693 30,352 
2006 103,374 1,534,832 686,956 50,313 
2007 158,887 1,991,768 1,057,399 94,531 
2008 137,219 1,733,810 697,718 54,791 
 
Panel B: Market capitalization 
2003 137,593 1,074,978 387,400 46,208 
2004 201,028 1,147,037 396,295 51,676 
2005 244,574 1,490,868 502,606 56,780 
2006 300,454 1,841,586 591,205 79,016 
2007 263,718 1,874,393 654,012 90,451 
2008 120,013 1,056,746 278,985 49,432 
The figures reported above are expressed in € million. Source: Euronext  
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Table 2: Evolution of investors’ composition in EURONEXT’s European markets 
The above table presents the percentage participation of each investor-type in the market capitalization of Belgium (BE), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL) and Portugal 
(PT). Data were obtained from the 2008 shareownership survey conducted on behalf of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE).  
a “Domestic institutional investors” include the following sub-categories: pension funds; insurance companies; mutual funds; and collective financial investment companies.  
b “Others” include the following sub-categories: commercial/savings banks; mortgage banks; limited companies; private organizations and trusts; and the public sector. 
c The decomposition of investor-participation for year 2005 in the Netherlands was conducted using the dual distinction between domestic versus overseas investors, hence it 
is not possible to distinguish percentages for the categories “domestic institutional investors”, “domestic individual investors” and “others”. 
 
 Domestic institutional investorsa Domestic individual investors Overseas investors Othersb 
 BE FR NL PT BE FR NL PT BE FR NL PT BE FR NL PT 
1993 17.5 NA NA NA 23.6 NA NA NA 21.1 NA NA NA 37.8 NA NA NA 
1994 20.1 NA NA NA 20.5 NA NA NA 21.8 NA NA NA 37.7 NA NA NA 
1995 21.6 26.3 NA NA 18.3 13.4 NA NA 22.9 24.9 NA NA 37.2 35.4 NA NA 
1996 22.4 27.6 NA NA 15.9 12.4 NA NA 22.7 28.0 NA NA 39.1 31.9 NA NA 
1997 22.4 28.3 NA NA 13.5 9.9 NA NA 26.9 31.1 NA NA 37.2 30.7 NA NA 
1998 23.3 27.9 NA NA 17.9 9.1 NA NA 23.0 31.9 NA NA 35.7 31.1 NA NA 
1999 24.7 27.5 NA NA 14.2 7.2 NA NA 30.4 38.1 NA NA 30.7 27.2 NA NA 
2000 20.3 28.8 NA 13.0 15.4 7.4 NA 15.0 31.1 38.8 NA 42.1 33.2 24.9 NA 29.9 
2001 21.8 30.4 NA 15.0 11.5 6.8 NA 14.3 35.7 38.9 NA 44.9 31.1 23.8 NA 25.8 
2002 26.9 30.6 12.0 17.8 10.2 6.7 9.0 12.1 28.3 38.5 67.0 45.9 34.5 24.2 12.0 24.3 
2003 25.0 29.4 12.0 18.5 14.5 6.7 11.0 12.4 30.4 37.5 69.0 41.8 30.2 26.5 8.0 27.4 
2004 22.7 31.4 NA 20.5 19.7 7.7 NA 12.7 28.8 40.0 NA 40.0 28.8 20.4 NA 26.9 
2005 19.0 28.5 NA 20.6 20.3 7.1 NA 12.6 36.2 40.5 80.0c 39.8 24.4 23.6 NA 27.0 
2006 18.0 29.0 8.1 20.7 19.8 5.8 4.5 11.1 37.8 40.7 79.0 42.8 24.5 24.5 8.4 25.4 
2007 18.7 28.8 8.9 19.9 19.5 6.7 3.6 9.9 38.7 41.1 71.0 44.8 23.1 23.4 16.5 25.3 
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 Table 3: Properties of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviations of betas on the market returns 
 
The logarithmic cross-sectional dispersion of betas is calculated here using betas of market returns estimated with ordinary least squares from the Carhart (1997) model. For 
each month, we used daily data to obtain OLS estimates of the betas and then these betas were used to obtain the cross-sectional beta-dispersion. (*) Indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
 
 
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
Panel A: Equal-weighted logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of Carhart-betas on the market returns 
 Pre-merger 
(January 1993 – 
September 2000) 
Post-merger 
(October 2000 – 
October 2009) 
Pre-merger 
(January 1993 – 
September 2000) 
Post-merger 
(October 2000 – 
October 2009) 
Pre-merger 
(January 1993 – 
September 2000) 
Post-merger 
(October 2000 – 
October 2009) 
Pre-merger 
(January 1993 – 
March 2002) 
Post-merger 
(April 2002 – 
October 2009) 
Mean -0.1086 -0.1492 0.1954 0.0021 -0.0589 -0.0094 -0.1086 -0.1244 
Standard deviation 0.0876 0.1598 0.1256 0.1287 0.0835 0.0058 0.0776 0.0988 
Skewness -0.0776 -0.1492 0.2293 0.1841 -0.0493 -0.0058 -0.0776 -0.0931 
Kurtosis -0.1975 -0.2822 0.5575 0.6542 0.6171 0.7592 -0.1975 -0.2455 
Jarque-Bera 0.5312 0.5101 4.3875 3.9423 3.2935 2.8425 0.5312 0.6492 
Panel B: Value-weighted  logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of Carhart-betas on the market returns  
Mean -0.5547 -0.4384 0.0412 0.0735 -0.6308 -0.7803 -0.3720 -0.3661 
Standard deviation 0.2988 0.4283 0.1992 0.2127 0.5538 0.5461 0.3801 0.2548 
Skewness 0.4186 0.2175 0.2957 0.2901 0.2965 0.3472 0.4083 0.4593 
Kurtosis 0.4614 0.3294 -0.3295 -0.3375 -0.2796 -0.2065 -0.5697 -0.6088 
Jarque-Bera 4.9518 4.9270 0.7067 1.1021 2.6691 1.4354 5.7438 4.2581 
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Table 4: Herding Results for Belgium 
 
 Original herding 
model 
Herding model 
controlling for 
market direction 
Herding model 
controlling for 
volatility 
Herding model 
controlling for 
SMB-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
HML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
WML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
Treasury-bill rate 
Herding model 
controlling for All 
factors 
Value-weighted 
herding model 
Panel A: Pre-merger 
φm 0.8848 (0.0601)* 
0.8872 
(0.0598)* 
0.9195 
(0.0511)* 
0.8843 
(0.0602)* 
0.8877 
(0.0593)* 
0.8833 
(0.0612)* 
0.8934 
(0.0570)* 
0.9187 
(0.0517)* 
0.7746 
(0.1435)* 
μm -0.0783 (0.0186)* 
-0.0794 
(0.0183)* 
-0.0665 
(0.0167)* 
-0.0782 
(0.0186)* 
-0.0787 
(0.0187)* 
-0.0804 
(0.0182)* 
-0.1082 
(0.0191)* 
-0.0683 
(0.0165)* 
-0.5128 
(0.0390)* 
c1  0.0364 (0.0856) 
     -0.1881 
(0.0471)* 
 
c2   -0.1796 (0.0476)* 
    -0.0470 
(0.0800) 
 
c3    0.0552 (0.2396) 
   0.1942 
(0.2271) 
 
c4     0.0703 (0.2169) 
  0.1028 
(0.2030) 
 
c5      0.1571 (0.2194) 
 0.2945 
(0.2050) 
 
c6       0.0059 (0.0034) 
-0.00003 
(0.0029) 
 
σ2m,η 0.0005 (0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0041 
(0.0035) 
σ2m,υ 0.0045 (0.0008)* 
0.0046 
(0.0002)* 
0.0043 
(0.0007)* 
0.0045 
(0.0008)* 
0.0046 
(0.0008)* 
0.0046 
(0.0008)* 
0.0045 
(0.0008)* 
0.0043 
(0.0007)* 
0.0668 
(0.0108)* 
 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 
 
0.2476 
 
0.2384 
 
0.1620 
 
0.2498 
 
0.2441 
 
0.2441 
 
0.2396 
 
0.1608 
 
0.2217 
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Panel B: Post-merger 
φm 0.6045 (0.1013)* 
0.5599 
(0.1112)* 
0.9510 
(0.0957)* 
0.6299 
(0.0981)* 
0.6264 
(0.0986)* 
0.6354 
(0.0987)* 
0.6187 
(0.0984)* 
0.9423 
(0.0313)* 
0.6498 
(0.0952)* 
μm -0.1301 (0.0138)* 
-0.1303 
(0.0124)* 
-0.0788 
(0.0063)* 
-0.1304 
(0.0143)* 
-0.1322 
(0.0141)* 
-0.1290 
(0.0141)* 
-0.1410 
(0.0140)* 
-0.0747 
(0.0131)* 
-0.6900 
(0.0451)* 
c1  0.1246 (0.0719) 
     -0.2241 
(0.0256)* 
 
c2   -0.2275 (0.0180)* 
    -0.0254 
(0.0490) 
 
c3    0.0718 (0.1445) 
   0.1840 
(0.1128) 
 
c4     0.1156 (0.1139) 
  0.0707 
(0.0848) 
 
c5      -0.0177 (0.0446) 
 -0.0279 
(0.0392) 
 
c6       0.0039 (0.0045) 
0.0029 
(0.0039) 
 
σ2m,η 0.0030 (0.0007)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.000004 
(0.00001) 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0026 
(0.0007)* 
0.0029 
(0.0007)* 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0247 
(0.0067)* 
σ2m,υ 0.0027 (0.0007)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0040 
(0.0005)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0030 
(0.0007)* 
0.0028 
(0.0007)* 
0.0038 
(0.0004)* 
0.0294 
(0.0068)* 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 0.6207 0.5990 0.0216 0.6001 0.6035 0.5784 0.6035 0.1209 0.54636 
The sample window for the above estimations ranges between: January 1993 – September 2000 (panel A) and October 2000 - October 2009 (panel B). With 
the cross-sectional beta-dispersion calculated each month using daily data, we end up with 202 monthly observations (93 pre-merger; 109 post-merger) which 
constitute our input here in the logarithmic form. The calculations are performed here on the basis of all (active; dead; suspended) stocks of the Belgian 
market. The above table contains the estimates from the tests of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model using the nine specifications outlined in section 4: 
equal-weighted beta dispersion; value-weighted beta-dispersion; equal-weighted beta-dispersion with volatility as control variable; equal-weighted beta-
dispersion with market index as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with SMB as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with HML as 
control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with WML as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with 3-month treasury bill rate as control 
variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with all these control variables included jointly. S. D. )](log[ bimtcStd β  here represents the time series standard deviation 
of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated betas. Brackets include standard errors of our estimates and “*” indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level 
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Table 5: Herding Results for France 
 
 Original herding 
model 
Herding model 
controlling for 
market direction 
Herding model 
controlling for 
volatility 
Herding model 
controlling for 
SMB-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
HML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
WML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
Treasury-bill rate 
Herding model 
controlling for All 
factors 
Value-weighted 
herding model 
Panel A: Pre-merger 
φm 0.8558  (0.0742)* 
0.8666 
(0.0715)* 
0.8193 
(0.1937)* 
0.8562 
(0.0732)* 
0.8655 
(0.0716)* 
0.8549 
(0.0747)* 
0.8501 
(0.0770)* 
0.7521 
(0.2901)* 
0.9149 
(0.0547)* 
μm 0.1695  (0.0208)* 
0.1679 
(0.0208)* 
0.2389 
(0.0116)* 
0.1700 
(0.0212)* 
0.1714 
(0.0210)* 
0.1695 
(0.0208)* 
0.1440 
(0.0202)* 
0.2520 
(0.0109)* 
0.0411 
(0.1134) 
c1  0.0771 (0.0988) 
     -0.3260 
(0.0374)* 
 
c2   -0.3084 (0.0393)* 
    0.0946 
(0.0914) 
 
c3    0.3635 (0.4632) 
   0.7622 
(0.4303) 
 
c4     -0.1149 (0.2386) 
  -0.0285 
(0.2163) 
 
c5      -0.0131 (0.2288) 
 -0.0999 
(0.2138) 
 
c6       0.0047 (0.0034) 
-0.0024 
(0.0021) 
 
σ2m,η 0.0008  (0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0008 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0100 
(0.0065) 
σ2m,υ 0.0082  (0.0014)* 
0.0083 
(0.0014)* 
0.0084 
(0.0013)* 
0.0081 
(0.0014)* 
0.0083 
(0.0014)* 
0.0082 
(0.0014)* 
0.0082 
(0.0014)* 
0.0081 
(0.0012)* 
0.2134 
(0.0341)* 
 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 
 
0.2236 
 
0.2077 
 
0.0947 
 
0.2292 
 
0.2125 
 
0.2244 
 
0.2228 
 
0.1106 
 
0.1826 
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Panel B: Post-merger 
φm 0.5735  (0.1360)* 
0.5848 
(0.1267)* 
0.6110 
(0.1759)* 
0.5626 
(0.1336)* 
0.5619 
(0.1330)* 
0.5630 
(0.1309)* 
0.5618 
(0.1350)* 
0.9495 
(0.1990)* 
0.9397 
(0.0495)* 
μm 0.2240  (0.0182)* 
0.2232 
(0.0188)* 
0.3109 
(0.0152)* 
0.2232 
(0.0183)* 
0.2235 
(0.0183)* 
0.2227 
(0.0184)* 
0.2372 
(0.0180)* 
0.3536 
(0.0929)* 
-0.4566 
(0.0588)* 
c1  -0.0996 (0.1094) 
     -0.3492 
(0.0841)* 
 
c2   -0.2535 (0.0361)* 
    -0.0847 
(0.1187) 
 
c3    0.0060 (0.0101) 
   0.1362 
(0.1949) 
 
c4     -0.0040 (0.0068) 
  0.2980 
(0.1415)* 
 
c5      0.0098 (0.0102) 
 0.3173 
(0.0846)* 
 
c6       -0.0046 (0.0058) 
-0.0056 
(0.0127) 
 
σ2m,η 0.0047  (0.0017)* 
0.0049 
(0.0017)* 
0.0020 
(0.0012) 
0.0051 
(0.0018)* 
0.0051 
(0.0018)* 
0.0052 
(0.0018)* 
0.0048 
(0.0018)* 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0019 
(0.0012) 
σ2m,υ 0.0110  (0.0021)* 
0.0106 
(0.0021)* 
0.0120 
(0.0019)* 
0.0106 
(0.0021)* 
0.0106 
(0.0021)* 
0.0104 
(0.0021)* 
0.0109 
(0.0021)* 
0.0115 
(0.0018)* 
0.0373 
(0.0059)* 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 0.5436 0.5588 0.3590 0.5651 0.5667 0.5683 0.5540 0.1042 0.0795 
The sample window for the above estimations ranges between: January 1993 – September 2000 (panel A) and October 2000 - October 2009 (panel B). With 
the cross-sectional beta-dispersion calculated each month using daily data, we end up with 202 monthly observations (93 pre-merger; 109 post-merger) which 
constitute our input here in the logarithmic form. The calculations are performed here on the basis of all (active; dead; suspended) stocks of the French 
market. The above table contains the estimates from the tests of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model using the nine specifications outlined in section 4: 
equal-weighted beta dispersion; value-weighted beta-dispersion; equal-weighted beta-dispersion with volatility as control variable; equal-weighted beta-
dispersion with market index as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with SMB as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with HML as 
control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with WML as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with 3-month treasury bill rate as control 
variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with all these control variables included jointly. S. D. )](log[ bimtcStd β  here represents the time series standard deviation 
of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated betas. Brackets include standard errors of our estimates and “*” indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level 
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Table 6: Herding Results for the Netherlands 
 
 Original herding 
model 
Herding model 
controlling for 
market direction 
Herding model 
controlling for 
volatility 
Herding model 
controlling for 
SMB-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
HML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
WML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
Treasury-bill rate 
Herding model 
controlling for All 
factors 
Value-weighted 
herding model 
Panel A: Pre-merger 
φm 0.9705 (0.0266)* 
0.9711 
(0.0264)* 
0.9174 
(0.0583)* 
0.9707 
(0.0265)* 
0.9717 
(0.0263)* 
0.9707 
(0.0265)* 
0.9699 
(0.0269)* 
0.9528 
(0.0436)* 
-0.5667 
(0.5343) 
μm 0.0082 (0.0311) 
0.0063 
(0.0309) 
0.0010 
(0.0164) 
0.0092 
(0.0315) 
0.0112 
(0.0321) 
0.0081 
(0.0311) 
0.0224 
(0.0310) 
-0.4370 
(0.0225)* 
-0.3211 
(0.0425)* 
c1  0.0380 (0.0750) 
     -0.2556 
(0.0442)* 
 
c2   -0.2144 (0.0415)* 
    -0.1805 
(0.0659)* 
 
c3    0.1132 (0.2915) 
   -0.1422 
(0.2572) 
 
c4     -0.3353 (0.1717) 
  -0.3486 
(0.1531)* 
 
c5      0.0258 (0.0745) 
 0.0415 
(0.0655) 
 
c6       -0.0001 (0.0003) 
0.0040 
(0.0002)* 
 
σ2m,η 0.0003 (0.0002)* 
0.0003 
(0.0002)* 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0004 
(0.0002)* 
0.0004 
(0.0002)* 
0.0003 
(0.0002)* 
0.0003 
(0.0002)* 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0053 
(0.0127) 
σ2m,υ 0.0039 (0.0006)* 
0.0039 
(0.0006)* 
0.0035 
(0.0006)* 
0.0039 
(0.0006)* 
0.0037 
(0.0006)* 
0.0039 
(0.0006)* 
0.0039 
(0.0006)* 
0.0031 
(0.0005)* 
0.1461 
(0.0240)* 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ]  0.3686 
 
0.2166 
 
0.1747 
 
0.2238 
 
0.2310 
 
0.2190 
 
0.2202 
 
0.1819 
 
0.1358 
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Panel B: Post-merger 
φm 0.6718 (0.0784)* 
0.6885 
(0.0791)* 
0.8647 
(0.0531)* 
0.6658 
(0.0814)* 
0.6738 
(0.0784)* 
0.6720 
(0.0787)* 
0.6659 
(0.0790)* 
0.8392 
(0.0582)* 
0.9995 
(0.0134)* 
μm -0.0639 (0.0168)* 
-0.0624 
(0.0160)* 
0.0235 
(0.0202) 
-0.0627 
(0.0157)* 
-0.0641 
(0.0169)* 
-0.0605 
(0.0165)* 
0.1848 
(0.0165)* 
0.1288 
(0.0182)* 
-0.4044 
(0.1819)* 
c1  0.1330 (0.0500)* 
     -0.2554 
(0.0299)* 
 
c2   -0.2411 (0.0315)* 
    -0.0538 
(0.0430) 
 
c3    -0.3347 (0.1933) 
   -0.0922 
(0.1625) 
 
c4     0.0120 (0.1271) 
  0.0848 
(0.1055) 
 
c5      -0.1660 (0.0865) 
 -0.2135 
(0.0739)* 
 
c6       -0.0021 (0.0001)* 
-0.0010 
(0.0002)* 
 
σ2m,η 0.0034 (0.0006)* 
0.0028 
(0.0006)* 
0.0010 
(0.0003)* 
0.0030 
(0.0006)* 
0.0034 
(0.0006)* 
0.0033 
(0.0006)* 
0.0034 
(0.0006)* 
0.0011 
(0.0003)* 
0.0069 
(0.0035)* 
σ2m,υ 0.0010 (0.0004)* 
0.0013 
(0.0004)* 
0.0019 
(0.0004)* 
0.0012 
(0.0006)* 
0.0010 
(0.0004)* 
0.0010 
(0.0004)* 
0.0010 
(0.0004)* 
0.0016 
(0.0003)* 
0.1268 
(0.0187)* 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 0.7002 0.6284 0.3794 0.6571 0.6990 0.6858 0.7002 0.3938 0.1542 
The sample window for the above estimations ranges between: January 1993 – September 2000 (panel A) and October 2000 - October 2009 (panel B). With 
the cross-sectional beta-dispersion calculated each month using daily data, we end up with 202 monthly observations (93 pre-merger; 109 post-merger) which 
constitute our input here in the logarithmic form. The calculations are performed here on the basis of all (active; dead; suspended) stocks of the Dutch market. 
The above table contains the estimates from the tests of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model using the nine specifications outlined in section 4: equal-
weighted beta dispersion; value-weighted beta-dispersion; equal-weighted beta-dispersion with volatility as control variable; equal-weighted beta-dispersion 
with market index as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with SMB as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with HML as control 
variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with WML as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with 3-month treasury bill rate as control variable; 
equal-weighted beta dispersion with all these control variables included jointly. S. D. )](log[ bimtcStd β  here represents the time series standard deviation of the 
logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated betas. Brackets include standard errors of our estimates and “*” indicates significance at the 5 
percent level 
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Table 7: Herding Results for Portugal 
 
 Original herding 
model 
Herding model 
controlling for 
market direction 
Herding model 
controlling for 
volatility 
Herding model 
controlling for 
SMB-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
HML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
WML-factor 
Herding model 
controlling for 
Treasury-bill rate 
Herding model 
controlling for All 
factors 
Value-weighted 
herding model 
Panel A: Pre-merger 
φm 0.9058 (0.0628)* 
0.8989 
(0.0619)* 
0.8838 
(0.2023)* 
0.8978 
(0.0650)* 
0.9093 
(0.0583)* 
0.9060 
(0.0621)* 
0.9057 
(0.0550)* 
0.8994 
(0.0897)* 
0.9963 
(0.0191)* 
μm 0.1883 (0.0246)* 
0.1811 
(0.0250)* 
0.2279 
(0.0133)* 
0.1896 
(0.0243)* 
0.1835 
(0.0263)* 
0.1863 
(0.0245)* 
-0.6396 
(0.0268)* 
0.3326 
(0.0153)* 
0.0823 
(0.1517) 
c1  0.2571 (0.1143)* 
     -0.3408 
(0.0466)* 
 
c2   -0.2775 (0.0447)* 
    0.1813 
(0.0958) 
 
c3    0.2361 (0.1364) 
   0.2685 
(0.1150)* 
 
c4     0.1097 (0.0883) 
  0.2288 
(0.0738)* 
 
c5      0.0018 (0.0014) 
 0.0012 
(0.0012) 
 
c6       0.0079 (0.0003)* 
-0.0011 
(0.0001)* 
 
σ2m,η 0.0005 (0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0053 
(0.0038) 
σ2m,υ 0.0181 (0.0026)* 
0.0170 
(0.0025)* 
0.0159 
(0.0022)* 
0.0175 
(0.0025)* 
0.0176 
(0.0025)* 
0.0178 
(0.0026)* 
0.0173 
(0.0025)* 
0.0131 
(0.0018)* 
0.0798 
(0.0140)* 
 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 
 
0.1508 
 
0.1664 
 
0.0487 
 
0.1612 
 
0.1612 
 
0.1501 
 
0.1716 
 
0.0253 
 
0.2040 
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Panel B: Post-merger 
φm 0.9215 (0.0469)* 
0.9274 
(0.0459)* 
0.2464 
(0.1828) 
0.9222 
(0.0466)* 
0.9259 
(0.0458)* 
0.9214 
(0.0469)* 
0.9278 
(0.0450)* 
0.4781 
(0.3821) 
0.7915 
(0.0951)* 
μm 0.1457 (0.0441)* 
0.1455 
(0.0421)* 
0.2174 
(0.0160)* 
0.1459 
(0.0444)* 
0.1397 
(0.0428)* 
0.1456 
(0.0440)* 
0.9508 
(0.0446)* 
0.9143 
(0.0133)* 
-0.4799 
(0.0521)* 
c1  0.1785 (0.1388) 
     -0.3700 
(0.0456)* 
 
c2   -0.3742 (0.0546)* 
    -0.0336 
(0.1160) 
 
c3    -0.0246 (0.1032) 
   -0.0369 
(0.0882) 
 
c4     0.1018 (0.0691) 
  0.1664 
(0.0576)* 
 
c5      0.0045 (0.0476) 
 -0.0786 
(0.0437) 
 
c6       -0.0082 (0.0005)* 
-0.0071 
(0.0001)* 
 
σ2m,η 0.0016 (0.0008) 
0.0012 
(0.0007) 
0.0086 
(0.0025)* 
0.0016 
(0.0008) 
0.0013 
(0.0007) 
0.0016 
(0.0008) 
0.0014 
(0.0008) 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
0.0091 
(0.0048) 
σ2m,υ 0.0167 (0.0028)* 
0.0170 
(0.0028)* 
0.0083 
(0.0025)* 
0.0167 
(0.0028)* 
0.0167 
(0.0028)* 
0.0167 
(0.0028)* 
0.0168 
(0.0028)* 
0.0156 
(0.0023)* 
0.0584 
(0.0104)* 
σm,η/S.D. log [ )(β bimtcStd ] 0.0104 0.2288 0.6032 0.0812 0.2372 0.2567 0.2450 0.2353 0.2671 
The sample window for the above estimations ranges between: January 1993 – March 2002 (panel A) and April 2002 - October 2009 (panel B). With the 
cross-sectional beta-dispersion calculated each month using daily data, we end up with 202 monthly observations (111 pre-merger; 91 post-merger) which 
constitute our input here in the logarithmic form. The calculations are performed here on the basis of all (active; dead; suspended) stocks of the Portuguese 
market. The above table contains the estimates from the tests of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model using the nine specifications outlined in section 4: 
equal-weighted beta dispersion; value-weighted beta-dispersion; equal-weighted beta-dispersion with volatility as control variable; equal-weighted beta-
dispersion with market index as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with SMB as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with HML as 
control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with WML as control variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with 3-month treasury bill rate as control 
variable; equal-weighted beta dispersion with all these control variables included jointly. S. D. )](log[ bimtcStd β  here represents the time series standard deviation 
of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the estimated betas. Brackets include standard errors of our estimates and “*” indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
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Figure 1: Belgium Herding Charts 
 
a. Original herding model                                                                       b. Value-weighted herding mode 
        
 
c. Original herding model controlling for all variables 
         
 
NB. Herding is represented through the dotted line while the continuous line indicates the market index 
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Figure 2: France Herding Charts 
a. Original herding model                                                                         b. Value-weighted herding model 
     
c. Original herding model controlling for all variables 
 
NB. Herding is represented through the dotted line while the continuous line indicates the market index 
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Figure 3: The Netherlands Herding Charts  
a. Original herding model                                                                         b. Value-weighted herding model 
         
 
c. Original herding model controlling for all variables 
 
 
NB. Herding is represented through the dotted line while the continuous line indicates the market index 
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Figure 4: Portugal Herding Charts 
  
a. Original herding model                                                                      b. Value-weighted herding model 
      
 
c. Original herding model controlling for all variables 
 
 
NB. Herding is represented through the dotted line while the continuous line indicates the market index 
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